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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellant Belki Maria Vasquez De Reyes appeals her 
conviction for marriage fraud, 8 U.S.C. S 1325(b) (1991) 
(now codified at S 1325(c)), contending that illegally secured 
evidence was erroneously admitted. Ms. De Reyes argues 
that the district court erred by admitting, under the 
inevitable discovery doctrine, testimonial evidence acquired 
as a result of an unlawful stop. We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. S 1291. Our review of the factualfindings is for 
clear error, and our review of the district court's application 
of a legal standard is plenary. See United States v. Herrold, 




The relevant facts are undisputed. In November 1996, 
agents from the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
operating in the Virgin Islands received a tip from an 
informant that three female illegal aliens would be in Maxi's 
Bar in Christiansted on the island of St. Croix of the United 
States Virgin Islands to sell fraudulent numbers for 
permanent residency cards (or "green cards"). The three 
women were described with minimal characteristics as 
follows: one had red hair; another was short and"hefty" 
with brown hair; the third was named Carmen. The INS 
officers had no other details about the women. 
 
INS agents Thomas Annello and Alec Lee proceeded to 
the bar where Annello encountered Ms. De Reyes, a native 
of the Dominican Republic, who proceeded to walk away. 
Annello instructed Lee to stop Ms. De Reyes, a stop the 
district court found was illegal because there was 
insufficient cause. In that connection, it is noted that when 
the issue arose Annello testified Ms. De Reyes appeared to 
have a reddish tint to her hair, but Lee testified that she 
had brown hair. Following the stop, Ms. De Reyes was 
detained and questioned about her citizenship. She 
admitted she was a citizen of the Dominican Republic and 
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claimed she was legally present in the Virgin Islands under 
a visa. Ms. De Reyes asked a friend to fetch her purse from 
a nearby residence, and was able to produce papers 
showing that she was married to Escolastico De Reyes, a 
resident of the Virgin Islands, but she was unable to 
produce a document showing she was legally present in the 
United States. Ms. De Reyes was transported first to INS 
headquarters but when she was unable to contact her 
husband, she was transported by INS to a correctional 
facility where she was incarcerated overnight. 
 
The next morning Escolastico De Reyes arrived at INS 
headquarters looking for his wife. When he was questioned 
by Agent Annello about his marriage, he maintained that 
Ms. De Reyes was in fact his wife. However, Annello then 
visited Escolastico De Reyes' home, where he observed very 
few articles of women's clothing, a fact which led him to 
question whether Ms. De Reyes did live there. Then 
Escolastico De Reyes' mother told Annello that Ms. De 
Reyes did not live with Escolastico, following which 
Escolastico De Reyes confessed that the De Reyes marriage 
was a fraud that had been established to enable Ms. De 
Reyes to obtain a permanent resident card. 
 
When Ms. De Reyes was confronted with the information 
about her husband's confession and the visit by the INS to 
his home, she conceded the fraudulent nature of the 
marriage, and signed a written confession to having 
committed marriage fraud. 
 
Ms. De Reyes entered a conditional plea pursuant to Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2) and filed a motion to suppress all 
evidence of items and statements taken from her and 
obtained pursuant to the stop outside the bar on the basis 
that the INS agents lacked reasonable suspicion to hold 
and question her. The district court granted the motion to 
suppress because it found the evidence was the fruit of an 
unlawful stop that was unsupported by reasonable 
suspicion under the Fourth Amendment. The district court 
explained that the reasonable suspicion standard was not 
met in light of the agents' contradictory testimony regarding 
Ms. De Reyes' hair color and the fact that Ms. De Reyes 
failed to match even the sketchy description given by the 
informant. That finding is not challenged on appeal. 
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The government moved for reconsideration of the 
suppression of Escolastico's statements and Ms. De Reyes' 
post-Miranda confession. The government argued that the 
testimonial evidence was acquired independent of the illegal 
stop so that suppression was not required and that even if 
acquired illegally, the evidence would have been inevitably 
acquired through lawful means. On reconsideration, the 
district court granted the motion, finding that these 
statements would have been inevitably discovered through 
an INS investigation of the De Reyes marriage. The district 
court's ruling was based in part on the testimony of Andres 
Oversen, an INS adjudicator. 
 
Oversen had testified concerning the INS procedures for 
obtaining a permanent residency card (generally called a 
green card) following the marriage of an alien to a United 
States (including Virgin Islands) resident. Such a card, 
which would enable a spouse to receive permission to live 
and work in the United States, can be obtained only after 
the filing of an I-485 form (an adjustment of status form). 
This is preceded by the filing of an I-130 form on behalf of 
the alien spouse. Although the I-130 form had beenfiled on 
behalf of Ms. De Reyes, they had not yet moved to the I-485 
form stage. Oversen testified that there is no time limit 
within which an applicant must file the I-485 form. 
 
After the I-485 form is filed and both spouses are on 
American soil, the INS ordinarily conducts an interview of 
the husband and wife. The spouses are interviewed 
separately and successively. Each is questioned about how 
they met, their families, their home life, theirfinances, their 
meals, and even any birthmarks each spouse may have. If 
the answers to these questions differ greatly, the 
adjudicator may request an investigator to visit the couple's 
home. 
 
A spouse not on United States soil can receive a 
permanent residency card by the alternate procedure of 
completing a State Department form available at the United 
States Embassy of the spouse's home country. In such 
circumstances ordinarily only the applicant alien is 
interviewed. However, if the alien had been in the United 
States illegally prior to completing the form at the United 
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States Embassy, there is a ninety-day waiting period before 
an interview is scheduled. 
 
Having admitted into evidence the confessions of Ms. De 
Reyes and the statements of her husband under the 
inevitable discovery doctrine, the district court found Ms. 
De Reyes guilty of violating the marriage fraud statute and 
sentenced her to time served, deportation and supervised 
release of three years. 
 
The single issue on appeal is whether the district court 
erred in admitting the previously excluded evidence of 
Escolastico De Reyes' statement and Ms. De Reyes' post- 
Miranda confession under the inevitable discovery doctrine.1 
Ms. De Reyes contends that the admission was erroneous 
because there are too many variables to find that a routine 
INS investigation would have inevitably discovered the 





The exclusion of evidence illegally obtained is one of the 
cornerstones of federal criminal procedure. See Weeks v. 
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1914). Similarly, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. To the extent that the government contends that the evidence was 
legally acquired or otherwise purged of the taint of the illegal stop 
because De Reyes arguably came to the INS voluntarily, we disagree. The 
government relies on New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990), which 
reversed the state court's suppression of a statement because it was 
made independently of the illegal entry into defendant's home. Unlike 
Harris, in this case Mr. De Reyes came to the INS office only after he 
learned of the arrest of Ms. De Reyes, which was tainted by the earlier 
illegality. The district court's initial suppression order was apparently 
predicated on the recognition that Mr. De Reyes' presence at the INS was 
inextricably intertwined with the illegal stop and seizure of Ms. De 
Reyes. 
This case is closer to Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), where the 
Court held that the prosecution had failed to meet its burden under 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963), to show that the 
confession at issue was "sufficiently an act of free will to purge the 
primary taint of the unlawful invasion." Here also, the government has 
not shown that the statements were the result of an "act of free will 
unaffected by the initial illegality." Brown, 422 U.S. at 603. 
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incriminating evidence derived from the illegally obtained 
evidence, colorfully termed the "fruit of the poisonous tree," 
is also excluded. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 
488 (1963). On the other hand, evidence that the 
prosecution can show has been discovered independent of 
any constitutional violation is not excluded. The underlying 
rationale for the independent source rule is that the 
exclusionary rule ensures that the police should not be in 
a better position as a result of their illegal action, but 
neither should they lie in a worse position. 
 
That same rationale was used by the Supreme Court 
when it adopted the inevitable discovery rule. As set forth 
in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984),"[i]f the prosecution 
can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
information ultimately or inevitably would have been 
discovered by lawful means . . . then the deterrence 
rationale has so little basis that the evidence should be 
received." Id. at 444. The rule so applied permits the court 
to balance the public interest in providing a jury with all 
relevant and probative evidence in a criminal proceeding 
against society's interest in deterring unlawful police 
conduct. See id. at 443. 
 
In Nix, the defendant was arrested for the kidnapping 
and murder of a ten-year old. While transporting the 
defendant, a police officer violated the defendant's right to 
counsel by interrogating him and thereby discovering the 
location of the body. By that time, the police had begun an 
exhaustive search that subsequent testimony revealed 
would have discovered the body within hours of the 
defendant's disclosure of the location. The Supreme Court 
held the improperly acquired information could be admitted 
because the prosecution had proven by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the body would have inevitably been 
discovered during the course of the lawful search. See id. at 
449-50. 
 
It is the government's burden to show that the evidence 
at issue would have been acquired through lawful means, 
a burden that can be met if the government establishes 
that the police, following routine procedures, would 
inevitably have uncovered the evidence. See, e.g., United 
States v. Martinez-Gallegos, 807 F.2d 868, 870 (9th Cir. 
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1987). However, the Supreme Court made clear in Nix that 
the analysis should focus upon the historical facts capable 
of ready verification, and not speculation. Nix, 467 U.S. at 
444, n.5. 
 
It follows from the Court's approach that the inevitable 
discovery doctrine has generally been applied in the context 
of acquiring physical evidence, such as drugs or weapons. 
Thus when the government proves that its officers conduct 
a routine search in similar circumstances, a court is likely 
to adopt the government's argument that the evidence 
would have been discovered in the course of that search. 
An example is presented by the recent decision of the Tenth 
Circuit in United States v. Haro-Salcedo, 107 F.3d 769 
(10th Cir. 1997), where the court held that cocaine evidence 
obtained from an unlawful search of an automobile was 
admissible because the police showed that the evidence 
would have been inevitably discovered in the inventory 
search of the automobile which always follows 
impoundment. Id. at 773. Similarly, in United States v. 
Kennedy, 61 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 1995), the court held that 
cocaine in a misrouted suitcase would have been inevitably 
discovered when the airline searched for identification of 
the owner. Id. at 498. The court explained: 
 
       Proof of inevitable discovery involves no speculative 
       elements but focuses on demonstrated historical facts 
       capable of ready verification or impeachment and does 
       not require a departure from the usual burden of proof 
       at suppression hearings. The exception requires the 
       district court to determine, viewing affairs as they 
       existed at the instant before the unlawful search, what 
       would have happened had the unlawful search never 
       occurred. 
 
Id. (citations and quotations omitted). 
 
In this case, the district court held the statement of 
Escolastico De Reyes and the confession of Ms. De Reyes 
admissible under the inevitable discovery rule. The court, 
relying upon the INS testimony as to the procedures likely 
to be followed in the course of processing residency permits 
based upon alien marriages, concluded that, following 
routine procedures, INS agents would have inevitably 
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uncovered essentially the same evidence of marriage fraud 
that resulted in Ms. De Reyes' conviction. 
 
In response to our inquiry, the government was unable to 
cite to any decision in which the inevitable discovery 
doctrine was applied to admit statements, as distinguished 
from physical evidence. While we know of no articulation of 
the inevitable discovery doctrine that restricts its 
application to physical evidence, and we are not prepared 
in this case to enunciate such a condition, it is patent why 
cases have generally, if not always, been so limited. A 
tangible object is hard evidence, and absent its removal will 
remain where left until discovered. In contrast, a statement 
not yet made is, by its very nature, evanescent and 
ephemeral. Should the conditions under which it was made 
change, even but a little, there could be no assurance the 
statement would be the same. Thus, even if we were to 
assume both that Ms. De Reyes would not have chosen to 
return to the Dominican Republic to apply for her residency 
card there, and that under routine INS procedures Ms. De 
Reyes and her putative husband would have been 
interviewed following her application for a residency card, 
there is no assurance that: (1) Ms. De Reyes would have 
filed her I-485 form without having taken any steps to 
create the illusion of a marriage with Escolastico De Reyes; 
(2) an INS agent would have "inevitably" become suspicious 
during the interview and would have requested an 
investigator to conduct a home visit; and (3) the interview 
and the home visit would have "inevitably" disclosed 
sufficient facts suggesting that the marriage was a sham 
such that Ms. De Reyes and her husband would have 
confessed to the fraudulent nature of the marriage. To 
reach all three conclusions requires engaging in precisely 
the type of speculation the Court proscribed in Nix. 
 
One can just as plausibly presume that both Ms. De 
Reyes and her putative husband would have been prepared 
for the interview and that their friends and relatives would 
have been coached to help create the illusion of a legal 
marriage. We are simply unable to say with any certainty 
that the INS would have discovered anything close to the 
kind of conclusive evidence that Ms. De Reyes' confession 
and Mr. De Reyes' statements provided. See United States 
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v. Namer, 835 F.2d 1084, 1088 (5th Cir. 1988) ("[A]t a 
minimum, the government would have to offer a theory as 
to the manner in which agents would have made their 
discovery. We agree with the commentators that emphasis 
is on `would' not `might' or `could.' ") (citations omitted). 
 
In adopting the inevitable discovery rule, the district 
court passed over several steps in the investigation process. 
First, the individual interviews are scheduled only after the 
I-485 form is submitted, which Ms. De Reyes had not yet 
filed. It is unknown when Ms. De Reyes would have filed 
the I-485 or even whether she would have done so in lieu 
of returning to the Dominican Republic to apply at the 
United States Embassy in Santo Domingo. Second, the 
home visit is ordered only if the interviewing INS agent has 
suspicions about the application. It is possible that Mr. and 
Ms. De Reyes would have been better prepared for the 
interview had it followed the usual course absent the illegal 
search. Third, even if a home visit were conducted, it is 
again plausible that the fraud would have been better 
disguised and more convincing. 
 
Moreover, there was no testimony that sham marriages 
are inevitably uncovered as a result of interviews and home 
visits. In many respects, the discovery of a sham marriage 
rests upon the skill of the putative spouse at deception and 
the detective instincts of the INS interviewer. The INS 
investigation into the De Reyes marriage had not yet 
commenced. The investigative process is not foolproof but 
depends upon a number of variables. 
 
We believe it requires an unacceptable degree of 
assumption and speculation to find that the incriminating 
evidence of marriage fraud would have been inevitably 
discovered. As the Seventh Circuit stated in United States 
v. Jones, 72 F.3d 1324 (7th Cir. 1995) "[s]peculation and 
assumption do not satisfy the dictates of Nix, however. 
Inevitable discovery is not an exception to be invoked 
casually, and if it is to be prevented from swallowing the 
Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule, courts must 
take care to hold the government to its burden of proof." Id. 
at 1334 (citations omitted). This is a case in which the 
government failed to meet its burden of proof. 
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For this reason, we hold that the district court'sfinding 
that the testimonial evidence would have been inevitably 
discovered by routine INS procedures cannot be sustained 
and we will direct the district court to vacate the conviction. 
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